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I. INTRODUCTION 
Encryption and ciphers have been significant in diplomacy, 
military activities, privacy for individuals, and have allowed for free 
communications even in areas without free speech. Encryption is 
necessary for the proper functioning of the Internet, because it allows 
private and secure transactions and can help ensure the identities of 
all parties.1  Authentication through encryption provides a layer of 
security on the Internet that helps prevent fraud and impersonation.2  
Without encryption, it would be impossible to safely make purchases, 
carry out banking, or perform most other actions which require 
confirmation of identity online.3 Innovative uses of encryption have 
even allowed the creation of purely digital currencies which can be 
exchanged in relative anonymity.4 
But encryption has also allowed illicit communications and 
materials to remain undetected. It has helped conceal attempts at 
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fraud, gambling, and loansharking.5 It has been used to conceal 
suspected child pornography.6  It has even been used to build illicit 
markets which sell drugs and permit the hiring of hit men.7 
Because of the effectiveness of cryptography at protecting illicit 
activity, contraband, and evidence, law enforcement and prosecutors 
have a strong interest in being able to view encrypted documents and 
information on encrypted devices.8  In some cases, they are able to do 
this through investigation and observation of the suspect, and in some 
cases they may be able to use technological means to overcome the 
encryption.  But there are times when neither of those options will be 
available and law enforcement will have a strong and legitimate 
interest in compelling a defendant to decrypt their own files.  This is in 
tension with the protections of the Fifth Amendment, which generally 
prevent a person from being forced to be a witness against themselves 
and may provide a shelter from being compelled to produce 
incriminating evidence to be used against them.9 
This paper will look when it is appropriate to compel a defendant 
to decrypt data in their control notwithstanding the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment.  It will review the jurisprudence that exists on the 
matter so far and then argue for a broad reading of the standards used 
to determine when decryption can be forced.  It will suggest that the 
foregone conclusion doctrine should be applied broadly when the 
government has access to the encrypted files already and can show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is capable of 
decrypting them.  It will also examine the complications which 
steganography and deniable encryption can create for compelling the 
production of encrypted documents.  It will conclude that, while the 
same standard should apply for standard encryption and for deniable 
 
 
 
 
5 U. S. v. Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d 572, 574–76 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 
6 U. S. v. Gavegnano, 305 Fed. Appx. 954, 955–56 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 
7 Cyrus Farivar, Feds Say Silk Road Suspect’s Computer Shows He (Thought He) Plotted 6 
Murders, ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 21, 2013), available at http:// arstechnica .com/ tech-policy 
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8 Certain groups within the law enforcement community have expressed concern with the 
growing use of encryption, particularly in the context of cell phones.  See e.g. David 
Kravets, Apple, Google Default Cell-Phone Encryption 'Concerns' FBI Director, 
ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2014), http:// arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 2014/09/apple- 
google -default-cell- phone-encryption-concerns-fbi-director/. 
 
9 In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment reads "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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encryption, those standards may be far harder to meet in practice 
when deniable encryption is used. 
Part II of this paper will provide a background on the history of 
encryption and the privilege against self-incrimination and briefly 
touch on how that can affect the Constitutional analysis.  Part III will 
explore the existing jurisprudence and the standards which courts 
have used in analyzing this question in the few times it has arisen.  
Part IV will explore analogies that have been used to look at 
encryption in the legal context and conclude that, while no analogy is 
perfect, viewing it as a combination locked safe is most appropriate.  
Part V will make the argument for a broad reading of the existing 
jurisprudence on compelled decryption that would create a reasonable 
standard for the prosecution to meet before they may use the power of 
the courts to compel decryption.  Part VI will explore deniable 
encryption and steganography and the complications beyond standard 
encryption that they can introduce to this issue.  Finally, Part VII will 
summarize the conclusions.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Cryptography in History 
Cryptography is an ancient art of transforming something with a 
plain meaning into something whose meaning is hidden until it is 
transformed or translated back.10  The word itself is derived from the 
ancient Greek phrase for “secret writing” and there is evidence that it 
was used in ancient Egypt nearly four thousand years ago.11  People 
have used encryption to keep religious information secret12, protect 
military secrets13, and shelter the communications between political 
dissidents or others with reasons to want privacy.14  At times, 
members of unpopular religious orders have used encryption to hide 
their secrets and their identities, and because of that there was a 
 
 
 
 
10 FRED WRIXON, CODES CIPHERS & OTHER CRYPTIC & CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATION 17 
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period when a church might view the use of encryption as a reason for 
suspicion of heresy or witchcraft.15 
There are numerous forms of encryption.  The Scytale provides an 
example of an early tool for encryption which was used around the 
fifth century B.C. in Sparta.16  The Scytale was a wooden staff that the 
Spartans would wind a thin strip of parchment around, and then write 
their message down the paper.17 When the parchment was removed 
from the Scytale, it was difficult to read.18 The message could be read 
easily by wrapping the parchment again around the same Scytale or 
another with the same radius.19   
Another early and simple form of encryption was used by Julius 
Caesar during his campaigns and is now frequently called the Caesar 
Cipher.20  In the Caesar Cipher, a letter appearing a certain number of 
steps later in the alphabet replaces each letter.21  For instance, if the 
number of steps chosen is three, then every “I” in the message would 
be replaced by “L”.22 However, ciphers like that are subject to 
relatively simple letter frequency analysis and can now be broken 
swiftly.23  Letter frequency analysis attacks and other forms of early 
cryptanalysis were developed in the Arab culture during the Abbasid 
era, when the tax records of wealthy merchants were frequently 
protected by encryption and use of cryptography was relatively 
routine.24 
Codes and cryptography were significant in the American 
Revolution as well.  Spies for the British often sent their reports in 
codes.  In 1775, men loyal to George Washington intercepted an 
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16 SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 8 (1999). 
 
17 Id. 
 
18 Id. 
 
19 Id. 
 
20 WRIXON, supra note 10, at 170. 
 
21 Id. at 171. 
 
22 Id. at 170–171. 
 
23 See Id. at 31. 
 
24 SINGH, supra note 16, at 15. 
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encrypted report from Dr. Church, acting as a spy, to a British major.25  
The revolutionaries eventually managed to break the substitution 
cipher used and have Dr. Church arrested for his actions.26  Similarly, 
Washington was confronted by the use of encryption in Benedict 
Arnold’s efforts to betray West Point to the British.27 
The Revolutionaries and the leaders of the young United States 
also made use of cryptography to protect their communications.  
Charles Dumas was, for a time, a secret agent for the United States 
and conducted much of his correspondence with the Continental 
Congress using a code in order to minimize the risks from postal 
intercepts.28  Statesmen such as John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, 
John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson used cryptography 
with some of their communications during the Revolutionary Era.29  
George Washington used encryption while exchanging letters with the 
Marquis de Lafayette around 1785.30  Outside of matters of state, John 
and Abigail Adams encrypted some of their private correspondence 
during the Revolutionary Era.31 
This may have significance beyond the historical curiosity and a 
demonstration of the importance of cryptography to this country.  
Some scholars have been concerned that the Constitution contains 
latent ambiguities.32 These are issues that were unambiguous at the 
time they were written, but become ambiguous in other contexts.33  
These ambiguities most often arise because of new situations created 
 
 
 
 
25 RALPH E. WEBER, UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC CODES AND CIPHERS 1775-1938 22-23 
(1979). 
 
26 Id. at 22-23.  
 
27 John A. Fraser, The Use of Encrypted, Coded and Secret Communications Is an “Ancient 
Liberty” Protected by the Constitution, 2 VA. J. L. & TECH. 2, 22 (1997). 
 
28 WEBER, supra note 25, at 23–25. 
 
29 Id. at 37.  
 
30 Fraser, supra note 27, at 22. 
 
31 Id.  
 
32 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 25-26 (2006).  Prof. Froomkin, although using 
different terms, expressed a similar idea.  He said that “[t]he Bill of Rights is predicated on 
assumptions about technological limits that may soon be falsified.”  A. Michael Froomkin, 
The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 709, 844 (1995). 
 
33 LESSIG, supra note 32, at 25–26. 
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in more modern eras that the framers of the Constitution could not 
have reasonably considered.34 But history shows that this situation 
does not arise in the question of cryptography.  At least some of the 
founders were accustomed to using it. Some, such as Benjamin 
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were quite well versed in the 
understanding of the cryptography of the day.35  They were even 
accustomed to dealing with a spectrum of encryption systems 
including those where the entire system could be memorized, those 
that made use of passwords, and those that required a physical object, 
such as a code book, to decrypt.36  Although encryption is now more 
common and sophisticated than it was for the Founders, they were 
well aware of its existence and its possible implications.  They could 
have considered them during the drafting of the Constitution and its 
first set of amendments. 
The American courts also dealt with ciphers and encryption quite 
early in their history.  During the trial of Aaron Burr for treason, his 
secretary refused to identify whether Burr had authored an encrypted 
letter on Fifth Amendment grounds.37  Aaron Burr had used both a 
dictionary code and a symbol cipher while communicating with some 
of his alleged co-conspirators, particularly James Wilkinson, and 
those communications were used as evidence during his trial.38  
Although the court ordered his secretary to answer the question of 
authentication for the encrypted documents as that could not itself 
incriminate the secretary,39 Burr was eventually acquitted of treason 
in 1807.40 
B. Modern Cryptography 
In the modern era, there are multiple forms and categories of 
encryption, though almost all are handled primarily through 
computers.  Computers and electronic communications have made 
 
 
 
 
34 See Id. at 166. 
 
35 WEBER, supra note 25, at 23–37.  See also Fraser, supra note 27, at 33. 
 
36 WEBER, supra note 25, at 48–50. 
 
37 U. S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (D.Va. 1807). 
 
38 WRIXON, supra note 10, at 49.  
  
39 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 38. 
 
40 WRIXON, supra note 10, at 50.   
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cryptography both easier to use and more significant.  It is now 
frequently used to protect access to sensitive data both in transit41 and 
at rest.42  It is also used as a form of authentication to permit the 
identity of the sender of a message to be verified, to ensure that the 
message has not been tampered with, and to allow for a form of digital 
signature.43  People protect both their traditional computers and 
modern smartphones and tablets with encryption.44  It has 
significance in electronic commerce, and has been used to help 
dissidents communicate privately in countries where free speech is 
not deemed to be fundamental right.45  Cryptography and the 
breaking of codes have remained vital for military applications.  For 
instance, code breakers played a significant role in the Allies' victory 
during World War II.46 
Although most encryption is secured by a password, sometimes 
other forms of cryptographic keys are used in place of or in addition to 
passwords.47  This could take the form of a keyfile whose contents are 
used as part of the encryption process.48 The keyfile may be stored 
 
 
 
 
41 Network Working Group, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, IETF (Aug., 
2008), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 (describing technologies used to provide 
communications security for electronic communications). 
 
42 Timothy A. Wiseman, Encrypting SQL Server Backups with Open Source Tools, 
MSSQLTIPS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.mssqltips.com/sqlservertip/2861/encrypting-sql-
server-backups-with-open-source-tools/ (discussing the use of encryption to protect 
database backups). 
 
43 The GNU Privacy Handbook: Making and Verifying Signatures, GNUPG (1999), 
http://gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/x135.html. 
 
44 Cyrus Farivar, Apple Expands Data Encryption Under iOS 8, Making Handover to Cops 
Moot, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 17, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/09/apple-
expands-data-encryption-under-ios-8-making-handover-to-cops-moot/; Robert Lemos, 
Latest Android Encrypted by Default, Adds "Smart" Device Locking, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 
29, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/10/latest-android-encrypted-by-default-
adds-smart-device-locking/. 
 
45 Tor relies on encryption along with sophisticated routing to protect the anonymity of 
communication made using it and has been used by dissident groups in countries such as 
Iran. Christopher Williams, Iran Cracks Down on Web Dissident Technology, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8388484/Iran-
cracks-down-on-web-dissident-technology.html. 
 
46 SINGH, supra note 16, at 186–87. The work of Alan Turing and others in breaking the 
Enigma code was particularly notable in its effects on the war efforts.  Id. 
 
47 TRUECRYPT FOUNDATION, TRUECRYPT USER'S Guide 66–69 (2012) [hereinafter 
TRUECRYPT]. 
 
48 Id. 
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separately from the encrypted document, and even if stored together, 
the fact that the user must identify the correct keyfile out of all the 
files on the device can provide security in addition to a password.49  
Alternatively, physical items such as security tokens or security cards 
may be used.50 
Most modern forms of encryption are divided by their use of 
symmetric or asymmetric keys.51  In symmetric key encryption, the 
same key is used both to encrypt and decrypt the message.52  There are 
a variety of symmetric key encryption systems including ancient ones 
like the Caesar Cipher53 and more modern ones like AES54 or 
Twofish.55  In systems where security is more important than speed, it 
is common to apply first one and then another symmetric key 
encryption system in combinations that are often referred to as 
cascades or multiple-encryption, such as applying AES first and then 
applying Twofish.56 
A contrasting category of encryption is called asymmetric 
encryption, or public key encryption.57  In asymmetric encryption, two 
                                                                                                                   
 
49 Id.  It is also possible to use multiple key files, which can be structured so that it requires 
multiple users for decryption if each user has access to only one of the key files.  Id. 
 
50 Id.  
 
51 Description of Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption, MICROSOFT SUPPORT (Oct. 26, 
2007), http:// support.microsoft.com/kb/246071 [hereinafter Description]. 
 
52 Id.  The key used in the encryption and decryption process is frequently not the password 
passed in by the user.  See e.g. TRUECRYPT, supra note 47, at 138 (Discussing header key 
derivation and cryptographic salt).  Rather, the password is normally used, possibly along 
with cryptographic salt, to generate a longer key, which is directly used in the encryption 
and decryption.  Id.  Though in some cases, even that generated key is used mostly to 
encrypt an even longer key that is used to encrypt or decrypt the actual contents.  Id. 
 
53 Description, supra note 51 (shifting each letter of the alphabet by a number of places is a 
description of the Caesar Cipher). 
 
54 TRUECYRPT, supra note 47, at 75.  
 
55 Id. at 76. 
 
56 See Id.  See also Himanshu Gupta & Vinod Sharma, Multiphase Encryption: A New 
Concept in Modern Cryptography, 5 INT'L J. COMPUTER THEORY & ENG’G 638, 638 (2013).  
Cascading encryption is meant to protect against weaknesses in the algorithm.  If one 
algorithm is found to be fundamentally flawed and vulnerable, the other should retain its 
ability provide protective, even if they are all starting from the same password.  
 
57 Description, supra note 51. 
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keys are created, one public and one private.58  The public key is used 
to encrypt messages and can be published to the world and distributed 
widely without compromising the private key.  This solves the key 
distribution problem, which had caused major issues in secure 
communications before.59  Meanwhile, the private key is kept secret 
and is used primarily to decrypt files that are encrypted by the public 
key.60  The private key can also be used to generate an electronic 
signature to authenticate documents through use of the public key.61 
A prominent algorithm used for public key encryption is called 
RSA after its designers Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard 
Adleman.62  The RSA algorithm currently underlies a substantial 
amount of the security for Internet communications, both by keeping 
the exchanged communications private and by ensuring that both 
sides are able to authenticate the other.63  Public key encryption is 
foundational to matters such as online commerce and private 
communications over a public network like the Internet.64 
The RSA algorithm relies on the fact that multiplication is 
computationally easier than division or factoring, particularly when 
dealing with large integers.65  Factoring is computationally expensive 
when dealing with large numbers.66  However, if a rapid way to factor 
 
 
 
 
58 Nick Sullivan, A (Relatively Easy To Understand) Primer on Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 24, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-
relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography/.    
 
59 SINGH, supra note 16, at 258–259. 
 
60 Sullivan, supra note 58. 
 
61 Id.  The GNU Privacy Handbook: Making and Verifying Signatures, GNUPG (1999), 
http://gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/x135.html. 
 
62 Peter Bright, Locking the Bad Guys Out with Asymmetric Encryption, ARSTECHNICA 
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/lock-robster-keeping-the-bad-
guys-out-with-asymmetric-encryption/.  Though much of the work done by Rivest, Shamir, 
and Adleman was based on and extended the work done by Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Hellman.  SINGH, supra note 16, at 272–273. 
 
63 Bright, supra note 62.   
 
64 Id. 
 
65 Id. 
 
66 Sullivan, supra note 58.  It has been proven mathematically to be equivalent in difficulty 
to other computationally intense problems.  Id. 
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large integers were discovered, it is likely that the RSA algorithm 
would become easy to break in a timely fashion.67   
Because of that, researchers have continued to develop other 
mathematical operations, which are easy to perform in one direction, 
but whose inverse is extremely difficult, often called trapdoor 
functions.68  New trapdoor functions can form the basis of other forms 
of public key cryptography, such as elliptic curve cryptography, which 
will remain secure even if an efficient method of factoring is 
discovered.69  Elliptic curve cryptography relies on solving the discrete 
logarithm for an elliptic curve.70 Elliptic curve cryptography is 
substantially harder than the RSA algorithm to crack by brute force.71 
Public key cryptography is computationally expensive and slow 
compared to many forms of symmetric key cryptography.72  For that 
reason, public key encryption algorithms are often used only to 
encrypt another long encryption key.  Those randomly generated keys 
are then used with a symmetric key algorithm, like AES, to encrypt the 
actual message, and the key used for the symmetric key encryption is 
then stored or transmitted along with the encrypted contents.73  This 
is sometimes referred to as a hybrid cipher.74 
C. Gaining Access in Spite of Cryptography 
If someone wants to gain access to encrypted data without the key, 
they are left with the options of attacking the cryptographic system 
 
 
 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 Id. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 Describing an elliptic curve with any rigor goes outside the scope of this paper, but 
briefly it is the solution set to an equation of the form y^2 = x^3 + ax + b where a and b are 
held constant and y and x are variables.  Id. 
 
71 One group calculated the amount of energy it would require to break elliptic curve 
encryption using brute force.  They determined it would take enough energy to boil all 
water on earth to break a 228-bit elliptic curve key using currently available algorithms and 
technology.  Id. 
 
72 Bright, supra note 62.   
 
73  Id. 
 
74 The GNU Privacy Handbook: Hybrid ciphers, GNUPG (1999), 
http://gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/x209.html. 
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directly,75 attempting to use brute force to discover the key through 
trial and error,76 or attempting to acquire the key by other means.  
Modern encryption systems, when implemented properly, can be 
impractical to unlock with brute force in any reasonable timeframe, 
and even more sophisticated attacks may not always be practical.77  
This means as a practical matter that decrypting modern, properly 
encrypted data often requires obtaining the key.  There are a number 
of ways to acquire the key even if the holder of the key does not intend 
to reveal it.78  Social engineering has repeatedly proven itself to be 
effective in acquiring passwords and other sensitive data.79   
Law enforcement agencies have also had success acquiring 
passwords through the use of keylogging software.80  For instance, 
while investigating Nicodemo Scarfo on accusations of gambling and 
loan shark operations, the F.B.I. executed a warrant and found a 
computer with encrypted files.81 Later, they, with new search 
warrants, installed a keylogger on Scarfo’s computer.82  The keylogger 
 
 
 
 
75 This is relatively easy for some systems such as the Caesar Cipher and can be done 
through a number of techniques such as letter frequency analysis.  See WRIXON, supra note 
10, at 31.  However, for other systems this is impractical or even theoretically impossible.  
See One-Time Pad (OTP): The Unbreakable Code, CRYPTOMUSEUM.COM  (Jan. 29, 2013, 
11:05 CET), http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/otp.htm. 
 
76 Mohit Arora, How secure is AES against Brute Force Attacks?, EETIMES (May 7, 2012) 
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1279619. 
 
77 See Id.  
 
78 One technique, that is only known to have been used in laboratory by security 
researchers, involves determining the encryption key used by the sounds emitted by the 
CPU.  Sebastian Anthony, Researchers Crack the World's Toughest Encryption by 
Listening to the Tiny Sounds Made by Your Computer's CPU, EXTREMETECH (Dec. 18, 
2013), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/173108-researchers-crack-the-worlds-
toughest-encryption-by-listening-to-the-tiny-sounds-made-by-your-computers-cpu.  
Another technique involves measuring the current flowing through certain parts of the 
computer while it is encrypting or decrypting the data.  Peter Bright, Stealing Encryption 
Keys Through the Power of Touch, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 21 2014), http://arstechnica.com/ 
security/2014/08/stealing-encryption-keys-through-the-power-of-touch/. 
 
79 See Sarah Granger, Social Engineering Fundamentals, Part I: Hacker Tactics, 
SYMANTEC (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/social-engineering-
fundamentals-part-i-hacker-tactics. 
 
80 U. S. v. Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d 572, 574-76 (D.N.J. 2001).  Keyloggers have also been 
used by hackers to gain passwords from an unsuspecting user.  Jose Pagliery, 2 Million 
Facebook, Gmail and Twitter Passwords Stolen in Massive Hack, CNN (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/04/technology/security/passwords-stolen/index.html. 
 
81 Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d at 574. 
 
82 Id. 
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acquired the password to the encrypted file along with much of his 
other activity on the computer.83  This enabled the F.B.I. to decrypt 
the files and acquire useful evidence.84  Their use of this evidence was 
upheld by the district judge despite the protestations of Scarfo on 
Fourth Amendment grounds.85  Another effective way to acquire the 
password is to compel the holder of the password to provide it.   
D. History of the Right against Self Incrimination 
There is some scholarly disagreement over precisely when the 
right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself arose in the British 
and American Legal Systems.86  One source of the right came from 
resistance in England to the oath ex officio, which required someone, 
who was not even informed of what they were being accused, to 
answer any question put to them by the official.87  Although there were 
complaints and arguments against this oath long before, John 
Lambert may be the first person to object on official record to being 
forced to take the oath by asserting a right not to incriminate himself 
in 1532.88 In 1533, Parliament took action to prohibit the oath ex 
officio,89 although it was once again permitted in 1583.90 While 
resistance to the oath may have started the process, most of the people 
                                                                                                                   
 
83 Id. at 574–76. 
 
84 Id. at 576. 
 
85 Id. 
 
86 See E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV 1 (1949).  
Professor Wigmore has asserted that the Framers of the Constitution may have been 
heavily influenced by resistance to inquisitorial system in France as well.  R. Carter 
Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege against Self-
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764–65 (2014).  Professor Langbein has 
argued that the privilege against self-incrimination did not arise, at least not in a 
meaningful way, until the right to defense counsel was also thoroughly entrenched.  See 
generally John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994). 
 
87 Morgan, supra note 86, at 1; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 46–
47 (1968); Pittman, supra note 86, at 769.   
 
88 LEVY, supra note 87, at 62. 
 
89 Morgan, supra note 86, at 6.   
 
90 Id. at 6-7.  Despite Parliament's action, the oath did not fall from use, as illustrated by 
the trial of Edmund Bonner.  Levy, supra note 87, at 74. 
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arguing against it focused specifically on it and not on a more general 
right.91 
Resistance to the later Star Chamber and its techniques started to 
solidify the idea that, during trial, a person could not be compelled to 
answer questions that would directly reveal their guilt.92  The Star 
Chamber was the judicial arm of the Privy Council and was authorized 
to use torture.93  The plight of John Lilburne94 helped drive the 
resistance to the Star Chamber when he was publicly punished for 
asserting a privilege not to testify against himself and refusing the 
oath.95 The general right against self-incrimination in criminal 
proceedings seems to have been well established in Britain by the 
1700s.96   
In America, the privilege against self-incrimination was also firmly 
established by the late 1700s.97  Before the end of the 1700s, seven 
states had some form of a privilege against self-incrimination written 
into their fundamental laws.98  The common law of many of the 
colonies recognized the privilege before they wrote their 
constitutions.99  When the Constitution of the United States was being 
ratified, several states, starting with Massachusetts, suggested that a 
privilege against self-incrimination be included as an amendment.100  
These recommendations eventually led to the Fifth Amendment and 
its protections against self-incrimination and other vital rights. 
 
 
 
 
91 See LEVY, supra note 87, at 66. 
 
92 Morgan, supra note 86, at 9. 
 
93 LEVY, supra note 87, at 35.  See also Id. at 49–51. 
 
94 The spelling of his name varies. Morgan, supra 86, at 9 n.34. 
 
95 Morgan, supra 86, at 9-10; LEVY, supra note 87, at 276–77. 
 
96 Morgan, supra note 86 at 12; Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 
600 (1970).  Despite this, forms of torture were still used to induce someone to make a 
plea. See Id. at 13.  The requirement that the accused actually be informed of the option to 
not answer the questions if they did not assert the right themselves came even later.  Id. at 
18.  See also LEVY, supra note 87 at 375. 
 
97 See Morgan, supra note 86 at 22. 
 
98 LEVY, supra note 87, at 409–10.  See Pittman, supra note 86 at 764–65. 
 
99 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 107 (1908). 
 
100 LEVY, supra note 87, at 416, 418–22. 
 
538 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 11:2 
 
Overall, the Fifth Amendment safeguards several values in the 
American legal system. It prevents torture and other abuses of the 
accused to extort a confession.101  It helps to ensure that the American 
system remains accusatorial rather than inquisitorial.102  But beyond 
protection from physical compulsion, it helps protect the accused by 
preventing the cruel trilemma in which an accused person may be 
forced to select between perjury, contempt, or providing evidence 
against themselves.103  It provides a protection for the dignity of the 
accused as well as a degree of protection for an individual's private 
thoughts from government invasion.104  Since the adoption of the Fifth 
Amendment, the precise nuances of the right against self-
incrimination have been refined and defined by the courts in response 
to changes in both society and technology.  Recently, the courts have 
been confronted with the question of precisely when the prosecution 
can demand decryption of potential evidence with some courts 
forbidding it on Fifth Amendment grounds while others have 
permitted it.105 
III. COURTS WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED FORCED DECRYPTION 
A. Courts Rejecting Forced Decryption 
The Fifth Amendment provides protection against defendants 
being forced to incriminate or otherwise testify against themselves.106 
It reads, in part, “[n]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.”107  Courts that have considered 
 
 
 
 
101 Dann, supra note 96 at 602–03.  See also Pittman, supra note 86 at 778–79 (discussing 
forerunners to the Fifth Amendment in the colonies that specifically banned the use of 
physical compulsion to extract confessions). 
 
102 Dann, supra note 96 at 602–03. 
 
103 Akhil R. Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 890 (1995).  See also Dann, supra note 96 at 
604. 
 
104 Dann, supra note 96, at 611.  But see Amar, supra note 103, at 901–02 (arguing that 
reliability of confessions is the main purpose of the Fifth Amendment and that dignitary 
rights are better protected by other Constitutional limitations). 
 
105 See infra Part III. 
 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 
107 Id. 
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whether an individual can be compelled to decrypt have generally 
found that forced decryption can implicate the Fifth Amendment.108  
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a man's right under the Fifth 
Amendment to refuse to decrypt his hard drives.109 In that case, law 
enforcement seized an array of digital media from a hotel room during 
a child pornography investigation.110  Despite forensic examination, 
the FBI was unable to access some of the media due to encryption.111  
The grand jury issued a subpoena for the unencrypted contents of the 
digital media, but the accused refused to provide the data, claiming 
that it would violate his rights under the Fifth Amendment.112  The 
accused continued to refuse to decrypt the drives even after the 
district court agreed to grant him limited act-of-production 
immunity.113  The district court, after a hearing, thus held the accused 
in contempt and had him incarcerated.114  He then appealed.115 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the Fifth 
Amendment could protect the accused from being forced to decrypt 
his hard drives.  The Fifth Amendment comes into force when there is 
compulsion for a testimonial communication or act, which is 
incriminatory.116  Here, and in most situations where the question of 
compelled decryption would arise, the fact that the act is compelled 
and incriminatory can be taken for granted.117  The Eleventh Circuit 
also found that the production of the files was testimonial.118 
 
 
 
 
108 See e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 
1341 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *3 (D. Vt. Nov. 
29, 2009). 
 
109 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at 1341.  
However, the court would have permitted forced decryption if he were granted both use 
and derivative use immunity.  Id. 
 
110 Id. at 1339.   
 
111 Id. 
 
112 Id.   
 
113 Id.   
 
114 Id. at 1340.   
 
115 Id. at 1337.  
 
116 Id. at 1341 (citing U. S. v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir. 1984)).   
 
117 Id. at 1341. 
 
118 Id. at 1346.  Although not mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit here, the finding that a 
password was testimonial has also been reached by district courts.  See e.g. U. S. v. 
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In considering the testimonial nature of the decryption, the court 
found it would "require the use of the contents of Doe's mind and 
could not be fairly characterized as a physical act" and that it would 
reveal "his knowledge of the existence and location of potentially 
incriminating files; of his possession, control and access to the 
encrypted portions of the drives; and of his capability to decrypt the 
files."119  The court stated that it was precisely when an act of 
production requires the individual to use "the contents of his own 
mind" to provide a "statement of fact" that it becomes testimonial.120  
The court also decided that this case did not fall into categories that 
the Supreme Court has previously found to be not testimonial, such as 
a mere physical act or a production, which would fall under the 
foregone conclusion doctrine.121 
The Supreme Court has found repeatedly that mere physical acts 
are not testimonial and can be compelled to aid in investigations or 
trials.  For instance, the Court has found that a blood sample may be 
taken without consent.122 Similarly, accused individuals can be 
compelled to provide examples of their handwriting for analysis.123  
Significantly, an individual can be compelled to turn over the key to a 
strongbox.124 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the situation 
                                                                                                                   
Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  In Kirschner, the accused was 
subpoenaed to testify and provide his passwords to a grand jury.  Id. at 666.  The court 
found that the passwords were testimonial and therefore protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id. at 669.  Even some courts which have compelled a defendant to decrypt 
files have generally held that the password itself is testimonial.  See e.g. In re Boucher, No. 
2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *7 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).  See also infra Part III. B; Part 
IV. 
 
119 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
 
120 Id. at 1345 (citing Curcio v. U. S., 354 U.S. 118 (1957)).   
 
121 Id. at 1345–46. 
 
122 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966).  In that case, a blood sample was 
taken from a man who was accused of driving under the influence of liquor despite his 
objections.  Id.at 758–59.  The blood sample provided evidence that he was intoxicated and 
was used at his trial.  Id.  The accused appealed claiming that using the blood sample 
violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id.  Although the 
court found that using the blood sample did not violate his rights, it said in dicta that other 
physiological tests may do so.  Id. at 764.  
 
123 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (finding that handwriting was an 
"identifying physical characteristic," and was not testimonial). 
 
124 See U. S. v. Hubbell, 539 U.S. 27, 43 (2000); Doe v. U. S., 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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involving encryption from these physical acts by saying that it 
required the contents of the defendant's mind.125  Further, it noted 
that decrypting and producing these contents would "be tantamount 
to testimony by Doe of his knowledge of the existence and location of 
potentially incriminating files; of his possession, control, and access to 
the encrypted portions of the drives, and of his capability to decrypt 
the files."126  It concluded that this production would be testimonial in 
nature.127 
Even communications, which are found to be testimonial, can be 
compelled when the foregone conclusion doctrine applies.128  The 
foregone conclusion doctrine applies when the government already 
knows of the existence of the evidence in question, knows where it is 
being stored, and can show the authenticity of the documents through 
means other than the testimony of the accused.129  The Supreme Court 
articulated the foregone conclusion doctrine in Fisher v. United States 
in 1976.130 
In Fisher, the Court dealt with two similar cases of taxpayers that 
received documents from their accountants and then turned those 
documents over to their attorneys.131 In each case, the Internal 
Revenue Service served the attorney with a summons for the 
documents and the attorney refused to comply based, in part, on the 
protections provided by the Fifth Amendment for their client.132  The 
Court agreed that if the Fifth Amendment shielded the client from 
producing the papers, then the lawyer could not be compelled to 
produce them.133 However, it found that in this case the Fifth 
Amendment did not protect the papers.134  The Court noted that here 
 
 
 
 
125 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
 
126 Id. 
 
127 Id. 
 
128 Id. 
 
129 Id. at 1344. 
 
130 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 
131 Id. at 394–95. 
 
132 Id. at 395. 
 
133 Id. (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307, 592 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
 
134 Id. at 411–12. 
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the government did not intend to rely upon the "truthtelling" of the 
taxpayer or accused, but merely needed access to the papers.135  The 
"existence and locations of the papers are a foregone conclusion" 
which "adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's 
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers."136  Thus, this 
was a matter "not of testimony but of surrender".137  Later, Justice 
O’Connor would make note of the significance of this ruling saying 
that Fisher “sounded the death-knell for Boyd” which had held that 
private papers could often be protected by the privilege.138  She also 
said explicitly in the concurrence that “the Fifth Amendment provides 
absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any 
kind.”139 
But the Eleventh Circuit distinguished this matter for the 
subpoena duces tecum from the matters that arose in Fisher.  The 
court required that the government show that the "location, existence, 
and authenticity of the evidence is known with reasonable 
particularity."140 However, here the government did not know the 
contents of the encrypted files, and had not made a sufficient showing 
that the defendant was able to decrypt the encrypted files.141  Because 
of the way the TrueCrypt software used by the accused works, the 
government could not even prove absolutely that there was actual data 
contained within the encrypted volumes.142  Thus, the court found that 
the foregone conclusion doctrine did not fit in this case even though 
 
 
 
 
135 Id. at 411. 
 
136 Id. at  411–12. 
 
137 Id. at 411 (citing In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)). 
 
138 U. S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1344 
(11th Cir. 2012). See also U. S. v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 320–21 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
141 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at 1346. 
 
142 Id. at 1347.  TrueCrypt will, by default, entirely fill a new encrypted volume with random 
data which makes it effectively impossible to determine how much actual data is stored in 
an encrypted volume without decrypting it.  TRUECRYPT, supra note 47, at 27. See also 
TRUECRYPT, supra note 48, at 37–54 (discussing plausible deniability). 
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the government in a sense already physically possessed the files that it 
wanted access to.143 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the district court could 
have compelled decryption if it had offered "constitutionally sufficient 
immunity" and the government had shown that the accused was 
actually capable of decrypting the drive.144  Referring to the landmark 
case of Kastigar v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit noted that to be 
constitutionally sufficient, the immunity must be "co-extensive with 
the scope of the privilege."145    
The prosecutor offered to grant the accused act of production 
immunity, in which the prosecution would not use the fact that the 
accused had the decryption key or decrypted the drive at trial, but they 
would be permitted to introduce the decrypted contents of the drive 
into evidence.146  The Eleventh Circuit, based on the precedent from 
Kastigar and other cases, declared that not to be constitutionally 
sufficient; the immunity had to cover both use and derivative use.147  
The Circuit Court said that the prosecution may not treat the 
documents as though they appeared like "manna from heaven" by 
using the contents of the drives without saying how they were 
acquired.148  Offering both forms of immunity would prohibit the 
prosecution from using the information decrypted by the accused at 
trial, and would have been of little value to the prosecution in this 
instance.149 
B. Permitted Forced Decryption 
Although the Eleventh Circuit denied the government the ability to 
compel the suspect to decrypt his files, other courts have forced 
 
 
 
 
143 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at 1346. 
 
144 Id. at 1349–50.  The grant of immunity the district court had granted was under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 6002-03. 
 
145 Id. at 1350–51 (quoting Kastigar v. U. S., 406 U.S. 441 (1972)). 
 
146 Id. at 1350–51. 
 
147 Id.  
 
148 Id. at 1352 (citing U. S. v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000)).   
 
149 Id. at 1350–51.  In addition to this, the Circuit Court questioned whether the 
prosecution and trial court were even authorized to offer only act of production immunity 
by 18 U.S.C. § 6002.  Id. at 1350 fn. 30.  The court also noted that transactional immunity 
would exceed the protections offered by the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 1351 fn. 32. 
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defendants to decrypt their data.  In 2009, the District Court in 
Vermont considered Sebastian Boucher's assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment right regarding a grand jury subpoena related to 
suspected child pornography on his computer.150  In that case, a 
Customs and Border Protection officer had inspected Boucher's laptop 
while he was crossing into the United States from Canada.151  The 
officer found files on the computer, which at the time did not require a 
password or the removal of any encryption to access, with names that 
suggested child pornography.152  After another officer inspected the 
computer, the agents arrested Boucher and read him his Miranda 
rights, which he then voluntarily waived.153  With some cooperation 
from Boucher, the agents continued their inspection and identified 
more files that appeared to depict child pornography.154   
Later, when other officers attempted to review the evidence, they 
found that the portion of the hard drive, which contained the 
incriminating files, was encrypted.155  Despite the help of specialists 
trained in computer forensics, the government was unable to decrypt 
that portion of the hard drive.156  The specialist stated that it was 
"nearly impossible to access these encrypted files without knowing the 
password."157  The grand jury then subpoenaed Boucher to provide 
unencrypted forms of all data encrypted on the drive, and Boucher 
moved to quash the subpoena based on the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment.158  A magistrate judge granted Boucher's request, but 
Boucher appealed to the district court.159 
 
 
 
 
150 In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).   
 
151 Id. at *1-*2.   
 
152 Id. at *2. 
  
153 Id. at *2.   
 
154 Id.  
  
155 In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007).   
 
156 Id. 
 
157 Id. 
 
158 Id. 
 
159 In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).   
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The district court noted that the contents of the laptop are not 
themselves testimonial.160  However, the court said that, under some 
circumstances, producing documents may be testimonial even when 
the documents themselves are not testimonial.161  This is because the 
act of production necessarily implies that the files do exist, that the 
producer had control of them, and that they were in some sense 
authentic.162 Since the Fifth Amendment can apply to actions, which 
directly imply an incriminating fact, the Fifth Amendment can shelter 
the production of such material.163   
However, the foregone conclusion doctrine, which was established 
in Fisher, can allow the defendant to be compelled to produce files or 
documents when the government already knows their existence and 
location.164  The magistrate judge that issued the original order to 
quash the subpoena had concluded that the foregone conclusion 
rationale was inapplicable because the government did not know what 
all of the files were and had failed to view the majority of them.165  The 
district court overruled that, saying that the government does not 
need to be aware of the contents of the files but only needed to show 
“with reasonable particularity that it knows of the existence and 
location of subpoenaed documents.”166  In this case, government 
agents had seen some of the contents and that was sufficient for them 
to know the existence and location of the encrypted data.167  Therefore, 
the request to quash the subpoena was denied, but the government 
 
 
 
 
160 Id. at *2 (citing Fisher v. U. S., 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)).  The court noted that the 
contents of the drive were prepared voluntarily, and since they are not testimonial they 
were not protected by the Fifth Amendment.  Id. 
 
161 Id. at *2-*3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).  In considering that matter, the magistrate judge had 
specifically found that either providing the password to the grand jury and entering the 
password into the computer would be testimonial.  In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 
WL 4246473, at *7 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007).  On appeal from the magistrate's order, the 
government narrowed the matter to only producing the unencrypted version without 
necessarily providing the password itself.  In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 
424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).   
 
162 In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *2 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009) (citing 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 147 L.Ed.2d 24 (2000)).   
 
163 Id. at *2 (citing Doe v. U. S., 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988)). 
 
164 Id. at *3 (citing Fisher v. U. S., 423 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). 
 
165 Id. 
 
166 Id. 
 
167 Id. 
 
546 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 11:2 
 
was directed to make no use of Boucher’s production of the contents 
in its case.168   
In 2012, the District Court for the District of Colorado faced a 
similar decision when dealing with the case of Ramona Fricosu, and 
applied the reasoning from Boucher.169 In that case, the government 
had seized six computers from Fricosu’s house while executing a 
search warrant.170  One of those computers was encrypted with PGP 
and the government failed in its efforts to decrypt that computer 
without assistance from the defendant.171 Later, the government 
recorded a conversation between Fricosu and her husband implying 
that incriminating information was on the laptop which was password 
protected.172  Using that conversation as evidence, the government 
asked the court for a writ requiring Fricosu to assist in executing a 
warrant to search the computer by producing an unencrypted 
version.173 
The court largely followed the logic in Boucher and cited to it 
frequently.  It concluded that the government had proven, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Fricosu was either the owner or 
primary user of that computer and that she had access to the 
encrypted data on the computer.174  It also concluded that the 
government knew of the location and existence of the files on that 
computer.175  Therefore, it concluded that the Fifth Amendment did 
not prevent an order for her to produce the unencrypted contents of 
 
 
 
 
168 Id. at *4.  This naturally means that the government will need to authenticate the 
contents of the drive in some other fashion.  Id. 
 
169 See generally U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F.Supp.2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012). 
   
170 Id. at 1234.   
 
171 Id.  PGP is the same program which Boucher used to encrypt his data.  In re Boucher, 
No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007). 
 
172 Fricosu, 841 F.Supp.2d at 1235. 
 
173 Id. In asking for this writ, the government relied on the All Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1651 (2012). 
 
174 Fricosu, 841 F.Supp.2d at 1235–36. 
 
175 Id. at 1237. 
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the drive,176 though the court also ordered that the government may 
not use the actual act of production against her.177 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has similarly agreed that 
decryption may be compelled so long as the act of decryption does not 
reveal new testimonial facts to the state.178  In Commonwelth v. 
Gelfgatt, Mr. Gelfgatt was accused of fraud and was believed to be 
concealing much of the evidence on his computers’ hard drives, which 
were encrypted with DriveCrypt Plus.179 When investigators asked him 
to decrypt the drive or provide the password, he refused, citing his 
Fifth Amendment rights, and the trial court, on motion to compel, 
agreed with Mr. Gelfgatt.180 As have other courts, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court affirmed that the production of evidence could be 
testimonial, and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment, if it revealed 
to the government new information about the existence of the 
evidence, the fact of the person's control over that evidence, or its 
authenticity.181  However, in this case the court found that, because of 
some of the statements made by Mr. Gelfgatt, the investigators 
already knew that he controlled the computers and had the encryption 
keys.182 They also knew that the computers had been used in the 
suspect transactions and were connected to the matter being 
investigated.183  Because of that, they satisfied the requirements of the 
 
 
 
 
176 Id. 
  
177 Id. at 1238.  The Tenth Circuit denied Fricosu’s request for an interlocutory appeal.  
Order, Fricosu v. U. S., No. 12-701 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012), available at 
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Encrypt/Fricosu.v.US.pdf. See also Compelling Access To 
Encrypted Information (Part III), FED. EVIDENCE REV. (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://federalevidence.com/node/1415. 
 
178 Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 513–14, 11 N.E.3d 605, 608-09 (Mass. Sup. 
Ct., 2014). 
 
179 Id. at 516, 11 N.E.3d at 610.  The Commonwealth asserted that the encryption would be 
virtually impossible to break.  Id.  Although it was not discussed by the court in this 
opinion, DriveCrypt Plus has features to have different amounts of data revealed when 
different passwords are provided.  Andrew Brandt, First Look: PGP Whole Disk 
Encryption 9.5 and SecurStar DriveCrypt Plus Pack 3.5, PCWORLD (Nov. 7, 2006), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/127620/article.html.  The implications of this ability to 
reveal a password and continue hiding some information are discussed in Part VI.B. 
 
180 Id. at 517–19, 11 N.E.3d at 610–12. 
 
181 Id. 
 
182 Id. at  523–24, 11 N.E.3d at 615. 
 
183 Id. 
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foregone conclusion doctrine as articulated by this court, which 
required the government to establish that it knew "(1) the existence of 
the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence 
by the defendant and (3) the authenticity of that evidence."184  Thus, 
the Fifth Amendment was no bar to the production and the defendant 
could be ordered to decrypt the files.185 
C. Comparing the Standards Used 
These cases each look at a situation in which the government 
sought to compel a defendant to provide a decrypted version of their 
hard drive in response to a subpoena and over the defendant’s 
objections on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth 
Amendment privilege provides protection for an individual when the 
statement or action they are being asked for is compelled, testimonial, 
and incriminating.186 When the government uses its authority through 
a grand jury, the courts, or otherwise to attempt to force an accused 
person to decrypt or provide a password, then compulsion is clear and 
the fact that the evidence is potentially incriminating is a safe 
inference.187 Although the question is more nuanced, revealing a 
password is also generally testimonial. 
Courts and commentators have generally found that passwords 
are testimonial in nature.188  The magistrate judge that first 
considered Boucher's request to quash the subpoena explicitly found 
 
 
 
 
184 Id. 522–23, 614. 
 
185 Id. at 524, 11 N.E.3d at 615–16.  They also found that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
was also sufficient show that this material was not privileged under article 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights even though that generally provides greater 
protection than the Fifth Amendment does.  Id. at 525–26, 11 N.E.3d at 616–17. 
 
186 See e.g. Fisher v. United States, 423 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 
187 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1341–
42 (11th Cir. 2012).  See also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (finding that a subpoena for physical 
evidence involved compulsion). 
 
188 See Andrew Winkler, Password Protection and Self-Incrimination: Applying the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege in the Technological Era, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 194, 
209-210 (2013) (arguing that passwords are always testimonial); Erica Fruiterman, 
Upgrading the Fifth Amendment: New Standards for Protecting Encryption Passwords, 
85 TEMPLE L. REV. 655, 678–79 (2013).  But see Greg Sergienko, Self Incrimination and 
Cryptographic Keys, 2 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1 (1996) (arguing that some keys can be 
constructed so as to be testimonial, but that most should not be viewed as testimonial in 
and of themselves). 
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that entering or providing the password would be testimonial.189 That 
magistrate found that forcing him to enter the password would ask the 
question, "Do you know the password to the laptop?" and thus 
confront him with the "forbidden trilemma; incriminate himself, lie 
under oath, or find himself in contempt of court."190 Although the 
district court overturned the magistrate's conclusion, it did so by 
finding that the foregone conclusion doctrine provided an exception, 
rather than by finding that it was not testimonial.191  Similar reasoning 
led the Eleventh Circuit to the same conclusion in a comparable 
matter.192 
This reasoning is in accord with other cases that have dealt with 
passwords or combinations.  For instance, the district court in 
Kirschner found explicitly that passwords to computers were 
testimonial because it required a defendant to reveal knowledge and 
use his mind.193  Many of the cases that consider this matter have 
looked to the Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Doe v. United 
States.194 
In Doe, the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant could 
be compelled, under the Fifth Amendment, to sign documents which 
would instruct foreign banks with which he was alleged to have done 
business to turn over all records pertaining to him.195  The Court found 
that this did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights.196  In that case, 
the majority found that signing these consent decrees, which had in 
themselves little information, was not testimonial.197  Justice Stevens, 
in his dissent, noted that a defendant could neither be compelled to 
turn over the combination to his wall safe, nor open it with a 
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combination, since that implicated using his mind.198  The majority 
opinion, in a footnote, agreed with that assessment, but found that 
signing the documents was more like handing over a key than using or 
revealing a combination.199  Based on that line of cases, it is clear that 
passwords and combinations will virtually always be viewed as 
testimonial, though that does not always mean that their production 
will be banned. 
Since the government sought compelled production of information 
that was testimonial and at least potentially incriminating, it sought 
an exception to the Fifth Amendment in the form of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine.  In these cases, the courts said that in order for 
the government to compel decryption under the foregone conclusion 
doctrine, it had to show that it knew that the person being subpoenaed 
was able to decrypt the drive or files in question.200 This is in 
accordance with a Fourth Circuit statement that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine would prevent suppression on Fifth Amendment 
grounds of a password given by the defendant when the government 
could show that the defendant was “the sole user and possessor of the 
computer”.201  Further, in each case the government was required to 
provide authentication of the files by some means other than the 
defendant's act of production of the decrypted data.202 
But the three courts examined different levels of knowledge on 
behalf of the prosecution regarding the contents of the encrypted drive 
or files. The Eleventh Circuit, when it gave the defendant the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment, emphasized the fact that the 
government did not know “what, if anything, was hidden based on the 
facts before us” even though the government knew the exact location 
of the encrypted data.203  The court in Boucher, in denying protection 
 
 
 
 
198 Id. at 219–220 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
199 Id. at 210 n. 9. 
 
200 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 
1346 (11th Cir. 2012); U. S. v. Fricosu, 841 F.Supp.2d 1232, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).   
 
201 U. S. v. Gavegnano, 305 Fed.Appx. 954, 955–56 (4th Cir. 2009).  In that case, it was a 
government computer that only the defendant had used.  Id.  The court noted that the 
defendant had consented to monitoring of his use of that computer, but that was 
significant in the analysis of the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fifth Amendment, 
claim.  See Id. 
 
202 See e.g. Fricosu, 841 F.Supp.2d at 1237.  
 
203 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 
(11th Cir. 2012).  Due to the way TrueCrypt works, it is possible that the encrypted drive 
would have had no meaningful data when decrypted, though the government pointed out 
2015] WISEMAN 551 
 
to the defendant, found it significant that the government had 
knowledge of at least some of the files protected by encryption, even if 
it had not viewed all of the data.204 However, in Fricosu, the court 
required only limited knowledge of the contents of the encrypted 
drive.205  The court specifically said, “the fact that it does not know the 
specific content of any specific documents is not a barrier to 
production.”206 The court in Fricosu referred to the decision in 
Boucher in making that statement, even though the government had 
viewed at least some of the encrypted files in Boucher.207 Unlike the 
case before the Eleventh Circuit, the government in Fricosu at least 
knew that there was meaningful data, rather than a drive filled with 
random data, contained on that computer.208 
Although the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the situation before it 
from the matters in Boucher and Fricosu based partially on how much 
the government knew about the encrypted contents, the court did not 
reject the reasoning on which they relied.209 Rather, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court merely said that the standards for the foregone 
conclusion doctrine were not met in that particular case.210 Taken 
together, these cases could indicate that the foregone conclusion 
doctrine is applicable to compel decryption if the government knows 
the existence and location of the encrypted files, has some knowledge 
of the data the files contain, knows that the user is capable of 
decrypting the files, and can authenticate the files without use of the 
defendant’s act of production.  The government must show that it can 
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specify the contents it is requesting with "reasonable particularity",211 
but based on the reasoning in Fricosu and Boucher, that can be 
achieved with only partial knowledge of those contents, and that 
knowledge may be inferred from other sources. Further, the 
government may be able to show that the user can decrypt the data if 
the government can show that they are the sole user of the 
computer.212  Under current precedent, the government will likely be 
able to compel a defendant to provide decrypted versions of the data 
despite Fifth Amendment objections. 
IV. ANALOGIES FOR ENCRYPTION AND THEIR RELEVANCE 
Courts frequently approach novel matters through the use of 
analogy.  The choice of analogy when dealing with a new situation can 
radically alter the way the law is applied. Many analogies suggest 
themselves for encryption.  One frequently used analogy is to say that 
encryption is like a safe, the data is like its contents, and the password 
is like the combination.213 This analogy, like all analogies, is not 
perfectly accurate.  For instance, being placed into a safe in no way 
changes the contents of the safe.  But encryption does change the 
contents.  It transforms them from plaintext to ciphertext, which is 
essentially meaningless without the ability to decrypt it.214  Also, any 
physical safe can eventually be destroyed or forced open to retrieve 
the contents if law enforcement has physical control of the safe, but 
effective encryption may be virtually unbreakable by any means other 
than guessing every possible password.215  Despite these flaws, this is 
 
 
 
 
211 See e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 
1344 (11th Cir. 2012).   
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214 EFF, Encryption Basics, SURVEILLANCE SELF DEFENSE, https:// ssd.eff.org/tech/ 
encryption (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). 
 
215 One analysis indicates it would take billions of years to break AES encryption through 
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computer security specialist said somewhat more optimistically during questioning that it 
could take the government years to decrypt the files in question in the Boucher case 
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likely to be one of the best analogies for considering encryption in a 
legal context.  Using this analogy would suggest, as some courts have 
already ruled, that passwords for encryption are generally protected 
from disclosure by the Fifth Amendment, though exceptions such as 
the foregone conclusion doctrine may be available to permit the 
government to compel the production of the unencrypted files under 
some circumstances. 
However, other analogies have been used.  For instance, it is 
possible to retain the safe analogy but argue that the password is more 
akin to a key than it is to a combination to a safe.216 The literature 
dealing with cryptography outside of the legal context often does refer 
to the password or other information needed to decrypt a file as a 
key.217  If this view were adopted, it would permit decryption to be 
compelled under many circumstances as a “mere physical act”.218  This 
view can be supported by the fact that in some forms of cryptography, 
the password entered by a user protects only a much longer password, 
which was formed by the computer itself and used for the actual 
encryption.219  In other cases, the key comes in the form of a file whose 
data was involved in the process of encryption and without that file 
turning over a password is of no value.220   
Viewing the encryption key as more similar to a physical key than 
to a combination presents a number of problems.  For one thing, the 
Eleventh Circuit has already explicitly rejected that comparison.221  
Even if another circuit wished to reconsider it, not all encryption 
works by using an extensive computer generated string as the key or 
using a file as part of the key.  It is possible to use the password itself 
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as all that is needed to encrypt or decrypt the data.222 In that case, 
there is nothing separate from the password that the user could even 
hypothetically hand over.  Drawing a distinction between those two 
forms of encryption, especially when such implementation details are 
virtually always hidden from the end user, is a strain of logic.  Even 
when something other than the password is technically used in the 
decryption process, that item itself is generally protected by the 
password, and in the case of the keyfile, the user must identify which 
file serves as the keyfile. That may still make it easier for the 
government to compel decryption by asserting that they know with 
reasonable particularity that what they are requesting is the computer 
generated encryption key that actually unlocks the encryption.  But it 
would not remove the fact that the government is trying to compel the 
defendant to use the contents of their mind and must therefore show 
that the foregone conclusion doctrine or some similar exception 
provides a reason that the Fifth Amendment does not privilege it.  
Thus, it is both logically cleaner and closer to the literal truth to 
consider the password more akin to a combination. 
Another commentator, Mr. McGregor, has suggested that 
encryption is much like a translation of the document.223  This is also 
problematic.  A translation is generally expected to continue to have 
meaning when the translation is completed, albeit in a different 
context and perhaps to different people or technologies than the 
original.  But encryption creates something which becomes 
meaningless without the decryption key or password. Further, 
translation at least risks changing the meaning in a way that cannot be 
perfectly recovered.  If a document is translated from English to 
Japanese, and then back again, the new document translated from 
Japanese will rarely be identical to the original, even if the essential 
meaning is preserved.  This is necessarily so due to the quirks in each 
language, which may have idioms lacking in the other, and words with 
multiple meanings or words which lack a direct translation into the 
other language. Encryption, though, perfectly preserves the ability to 
restore the original. Moreover, viewing encryption as a mere 
translation is likely to remove any presumption that encryption 
creates an expectation of privacy for purposes such as the Fourth 
 
 
 
 
222 Although it could not be seriously relied upon for security today, the Caesar Cipher uses 
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Amendment, given that speaking in another language has been held to 
not create an expectation of privacy.224  Although there is a sense in 
which encryption is a translation, it is not helpful as an analogy. 
At least one paper suggests that encryption can also be viewed as a 
special form of shredding the encrypted documents.225 In this form of 
shredding, each piece of the shredded paper contains an identifier to 
show where it should go, but the shredding also requires a map to 
show how the pieces of paper should be arranged in order to extract 
any meaning from it.226 While there is some appeal to this 
comparison, it is not overly useful in this context.  Analogies to aid 
reasoning should be as simple as possible and grounded as nearly as 
possible to something which is both concrete and familiar to those 
considering the analogy.  This one is far less concrete and familiar to 
most people than would be either a safe or a translator.  More than 
that, it could be misleading.  It suggests that it would require far more 
work and information from the defendant to get the unencrypted 
version back than it does with the use of automated encryption, while 
at the same time making it seem far more realistic that law 
enforcement could create the decrypted version without help from the 
defendant than is true with effective encryption. 
While no analogy is perfect, encryption in this context is most 
aptly described as storing digital items within a safe that is secured by 
a combination.  This is less reflective of the actual process that the 
computer uses to encrypt documents than either the translation or the 
shredding analogies.  But it comes closest to capturing the experience 
of computer users and how they actually use encryption, which is 
more significant when determining how to treat it in jurisprudence 
and how to compare it to precedent already in place.  
 
 
 
 
224 U. S. v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999) (dealing with drug dealers that 
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V. TOWARDS BROADER USE OF THE FOREGONE CONCLUSION DOCTRINE 
A. The Argument for a Low Standard for Finding a Foregone 
Conclusion 
Looking at encryption through the analogy of a safe and examining 
the precedent which has been created so far provides a test for when 
the government can compel a defendant to decrypt potentially 
incriminating files. The Fifth Amendment will generally prevent 
forced decryption by a criminal defendant unless the government 
gives constitutionally sufficient immunity or an exception applies.  
Constitutionally sufficient immunity requires both use and derivative 
use immunity regarding that particular defendant.  In this context, the 
exception that will apply most often and be most useful to the 
prosecutor is the foregone conclusion doctrine. 
The foregone conclusion doctrine requires the government to 
establish that it can show with reasonable particularity the existence 
and location of the documents and be able to authenticate them 
without use of the defendant’s production of the documents.227  
Currently, established precedent indicates that the government must 
have some idea of the contents it expects to find protected by 
encryption.  The Eleventh Circuit quashed the subpoena based largely 
on the fact that the government could not establish that there would 
be any data at all if the drives were decrypted.228  In both Boucher and 
Fricosu, the government had some knowledge of some of the 
encrypted contents either through agents that had seen some of the 
contents or by hearing about them from conversations the defendant 
had about the contents.229 
But the doctrines on which these decisions are based do not 
require that the government have actual knowledge of the contents 
they are requesting, but merely the location and existence of those 
contents and the ability to authenticate them independently.230  The 
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establish that it could authenticate any documents produced without using the defendant’s 
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Fisher court, which originally laid out the foregone conclusion 
doctrine, based the doctrine largely on the fact that the government 
was “in no way relying on the 'truthtelling' of the taxpayer.”231  But 
when the government is asking for compelled decryption, it is not 
asking for the defendant to tell the truth about anything.  It is instead 
asking for the defendant to surrender the voluntarily prepared 
documents.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that the government does not 
need to “identify exactly the documents it seeks,”232 and the court in 
Fricosu made a slightly stronger statement that “the fact that [the 
government] does not know the specific content of any specific 
documents is not a barrier to production.”233   
The fact that the government does not know what is contained, or 
that anything meaningful is contained, inside the encrypted data 
should not be a barrier to production.  In saying that the government 
did not know enough to meet the standard in that case, the Eleventh 
Circuit said that the government could only establish that there were 
“random characters” on the drive since “the TrueCrypt program 
displays random characters if there are files and if there is empty 
space” and “random character are not files.”234  But even an empty file 
is a file,235 and if the government does not need to know the exact 
contents of what it is requesting, then there is no reason it should be 
barred from receiving a decrypted copy just because the decrypted file 
would be blank.  The Eleventh Circuit said that the government 
needed to have “some specificity in its requests – categorical requests 
for documents the Government anticipates are likely to exist simply 
will not suffice.”236   
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In making that statement, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hubbell.237 In that case, Webster Hubbell was prosecuted 
for tax-related crimes and fraud.238  The prosecution built its case 
largely on documents provided by Hubbell himself after he had been 
granted immunity to the extent allowed by law.239 Those documents 
had been assembled by Hubbell, after he asserted his Fifth 
Amendment rights and was granted immunity, from the documents in 
his collection in response to a broad subpoena for eleven categories of 
documents.240  Prior to Hubbell’s response, the government could not 
have shown that it had any knowledge of the existence of these 
documents other than through a broad argument that a businessman 
would always keep such records.241  The Court concluded that, under 
those circumstances, the grant of immunity covered both use and 
derivative use and that the foregone conclusion doctrine did not apply 
and the documents could not be used against Hubbell.242 
But the situation where the government seeks to force decryption 
of encrypted files it already possesses is different from the situation 
the Supreme Court faced in Hubbell. In Hubbell, the government did 
not know prior to granting immunity that the documents it was going 
to receive existed.243  When the government seeks to force decryption 
it clearly knows that a document exists in the form the encrypted file 
or partition that it seeks to decrypt.  The government may not be able 
to show ahead of time that the file will have meaningful content once 
decrypted, but that is different from not knowing its existence at all.  
In Hubbell, the government did not know the location of the files 
ahead of time, and Hubbell was forced to expend considerable thought 
and effort assembling those documents that were responsive to the 
subpoena.244  When the government asks for decryption, it already 
knows where the files are because it has them in its possession.  Under 
the current Supreme Court precedent, the government should not 
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need to prove that it has any knowledge of the content of the 
encrypted drive, or even that there is content beyond a blank file. 
Adopting this standard would make it easier for the government to 
compel a defendant to decrypt protected information than it is now.  
But that is wise from a policy standpoint, and supported by current 
precedent.  The Fifth Amendment, according to the Supreme Court, 
“does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every 
sort of incriminating evidence” and “protects a person only against 
being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial 
communications.”245 Someone could not effectively protect documents 
merely by placing those documents in a safe locked by a combination, 
so they should not be able to shield them from the view of the courts 
merely by placing them digitally behind the wall of encryption. 
Although taking this view of the foregone conclusion doctrine 
would make it simpler for the government to compel decryption in 
some cases, it would not remove all hurdles or safeguards preventing 
the government from demanding decryption in all cases. The 
government must legitimately gain access to the encrypted file itself, 
which will mean at least in some instances that it must have satisfied 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.246 Even when the 
government has the encrypted file in hand and has obtained it in a 
legitimate way, it must show that the defendant is capable of 
decrypting it.  This is part of the authentication standard it must meet 
for the foregone conclusion doctrine, and a person cannot be 
compelled to do something they are incapable of doing.  The court in 
Fricosu properly found that Fricosu was capable of decrypting the 
drive in question and used a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.247 
There, the court focused on the fact that she was the “sole or 
primary user” of the computer.248  That may not always be enough to 
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was the sole user of the computer when it applied the foregone conclusion doctrine, though 
in that case there was no doubt he was capable since he had already provided the 
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show that someone has the ability to decrypt files on their computer.  
For instance, public key cryptography allows a person to encrypt a file 
in such a way that someone else, and only that other person, is able to 
decrypt it.249  This is frequently used on sensitive files before they are 
transmitted over the Internet, and it is entirely possible that an 
unencrypted version would not be retained.  Similarly, there are 
distributed storage systems and distributed communications systems 
in which the user permits some of their hard drive space to be used by 
others to store encrypted fragments of files for other users, and in 
exchange the other users allow them to do the same.250  Such systems 
may be used for backup purposes or to allow remote access to data.251  
Under such a system the user does not have the ability to directly 
access the encrypted data stored on the drive.252  Similarly, there are 
certain programs that will encrypt part of a user’s hard drive against 
their will in order to try to extort money, often in the form of bitcoins, 
from the user to get the encryption key to recover the data.253 With 
these possibilities for a user to not be able to decrypt all data on their 
own systems, it may be necessary in many instances for a prosecutor 
to provide more evidence than merely ownership of a system to 
establish that the defendant can decrypt the data in question. 
Adopting this standard would make it relatively easy for 
prosecutors to demand decryption of files, while still providing 
safeguards for cases where the accused is genuinely incapable of 
decrypting the file.  It requires the prosecutor to show that they know 
the files in question exist and where the file is by legitimately 
acquiring the encrypted version of the files first.  The prosecutor 
would also need to show that the defendant is able to decrypt the file.  
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Similarly, in order to make use of the files at trial, the prosecutor will 
need to be able to authenticate them without relying on the fact that 
the defendant decrypted them, though the same evidence that the 
defendant was able to decrypt them would be applicable in most cases. 
B. Literature Review and Responses 
Other methods have been proposed to logically and efficiently 
handle the complications that strong encryption can create for law 
enforcement.  One note, by Mr. Ungberg, recommended a system in 
which prosecutors who wanted access to an encrypted file would seek 
a warrant with probable cause for a search of the file that specified 
precisely what data they were seeking.254  The note gave an example of 
the warrant laying out tax returns for certain years.255  The prosecutor 
would then be able to obtain a subpoena for the encryption password, 
but would be barred from using any evidence other than what was 
specified in the warrants, and in particular would be barred from 
using evidence of crimes for which they were not yet investigating the 
defendant.256   
This proposed system is appealing in many ways.  It provides a 
clean and clear procedure for police and prosecution to follow and 
would not permit strong encryption to form an absolute bar to the 
prosecution.  But it does not explain how this new proposal could be 
fit into existing jurisprudence where passwords have repeatedly been 
held to be testimonial, even if some exceptions have permitted them 
to be compelled under some circumstances.  Nor does the proposed 
system answer whether the prosecution would be able to use the 
defendant’s production as authentication by itself.  Finally, it seems 
inconsistent with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to ban 
the use of absolutely all other data not described in the warrant and 
not allow investigators to “stumble upon” at least some forms 
incriminating evidence while executing their allowed search.257  Once 
the metaphorical safe of an encrypted file is open, then seeing images 
which are clearly child pornography would likely fall under the plain 
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view doctrine in the same way that finding a silencer in a filing cabinet 
that was properly being searched under a warrant would.258 
Another article claimed that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
could never apply to the production of a password or to the act of 
decryption.259 The article relies on the magistrate’s decision in 
Boucher to assert that the foregone conclusion doctrine “would not 
apply to the production of non-physical evidence existing only in a 
suspect’s mind where the act of production can be used against 
him.”260  Based on that, and the fact that the password exists only in 
the mind of the defendant, it is immune to a foregone conclusion 
doctrine.   
There is some merit to this argument where the password does 
exist only in the defendant’s mind and where the government seeks 
the password for its own sake.  But passwords frequently exist in some 
tangible form, whether written down or held in a password 
management program.261 Even for passwords that have never existed 
in a tangible form, it is rare for the government to seek the password 
itself.  Rather, the prosecution wants the password only as a means to 
get the documents.  If the defendant wishes to maintain the secrecy of 
the password, the government will virtually always be content with 
turning over an unencrypted version of the encrypted file or having 
the defendant enter the password for them.  This avoids the defendant 
ever directly providing something that “exists only in his mind.”262  
The possibility of the act of production being used against the 
defendant does raise further Fifth Amendment concerns, but those are 
handled by forcing the prosecution to establish the authenticity of the 
documents without aid from the defendant and further safeguarded 
by a court order that the prosecution may not use the defendant’s 
possession of the key against them, as the courts in Boucher and 
Fricosu did.263  
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A more moderate approach, suggested by Mr. Clemens, would 
continue to permit the foregone conclusion doctrine to be used to 
compel encryption, but would demand an exceptionally high standard 
of proof from the prosecutor to show that it was applicable in the case 
at hand.264  That note asserts each prong of the Fisher test to establish 
that the contents of the encrypted file should be shown with clear and 
convincing evidence.265  It further asserts that in proving that the 
government knows the location of the documents, it must show that 
the defendant was the only person who had access to the decryption 
key or that the defendant specifically accessed a particular document 
within the encrypted file.266  Finally, he asserts that the government 
must prove the authenticity of the documents that it is seeking, prior 
to compelling the decryption.267 
But he goes too far.  The courts when looking at the foregone 
conclusion doctrine have generally required only reasonable 
particularity in establishing that the government knows the existence 
and location of the files that it seeks.268  Clearly, the government must 
show that the defendant has the ability to decrypt the files the 
government wants them to decrypt, but at least one court has held 
that it is sufficient to show this by preponderance of the evidence.269  
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, showing this by a preponderance 
of the evidence is sufficient.  If the files were in a safe, the government 
would be able to obtain them by breaking open the container if the 
government first acquired a warrant.270   
Additionally, there is no requirement that the government make 
full proof of its ability to authenticate the documents prior to receiving 
them.  The district court in Boucher was willing to compel decryption 
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on the government’s statements that it would authenticate any 
document which it did use later and explicitly refused to rule at that 
time on whether the government would succeed in doing so.271  
Moreover, some documents may prove easy to authenticate once 
received, especially if those documents contain a scanned signature or 
a digital signature.272 The claim that the government must show that 
the defendant is the only one capable of decrypting the file or has 
personally accessed the file is simply not supported by either current 
jurisprudence or policy, so long as the government can show that the 
defendant is capable of decrypting it. 
Mr. Clemens also stated that compelling key disclosure could 
provide far more than compelling the decryption of a particular 
encrypted file since the same key may be able to decrypt numerous 
documents.273  This is particularly true regarding public key 
encryption where a user may have one key that decrypts virtually all of 
his documents.  This is a good reason to favor compelling the 
defendant to provide a decrypted version of the documents rather 
than turn over the key itself.274 
Mr. Reitinger took almost the opposite views from Mr. Clemens.275  
Mr. Reitinger has noted that there is an obligation to produce 
documents in a readable format, in other words, unencrypted, when 
they are responsive to a subpoena.276  The results in that case would 
not be different if they were locked in safe or sitting on a desk, the 
defendant must respond to a legally authorized subpoena even if the 
files are encrypted.277  He is entirely right on that, except when the 
subpoena may be challenged on some grounds such as it being in 
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violation of the Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court in Hubble 
found that the production of documents of broad classes could be 
incriminating and would not fall into an exception of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine if the defendant made use of extensive contents of 
his mind in assembling those documents and revealed their existence 
precisely by turning them over.278 In some instances, the government 
will be able to subpoena specific documents and will know they exist, 
such as when the government wants to acquire a specific tax record.  
In those cases, whether the party has stored them physically inside a 
safe, digitally protected by encryption, or left them lying on the table is 
irrelevant. 
However, this argument will not be sufficient when the 
government must make a broader request.  For instance, in Boucher, 
the government wanted to view all of the files that were within the 
encrypted drive, not merely those which it could specifically name, 
because they had been viewed before.279  Since the files it was seeking 
were contraband by nature, any production of those files which 
revealed the existence of files the government did not know about 
previously would implicate the Fifth Amendment by showing their 
existence unless some exception to that privilege applied. Mr. 
Reitinger correctly points out that a subpoena that requires the 
defendant to produce plaintext is no different from one that requires 
the defendant to produce the documents from a safe.280  While this is 
correct, if the safe were secured by a combination, the government 
would have to prove some exception to the Fifth Amendment to 
compel the defendant himself to open it so that they could view all the 
documents within it.281  Thus, this helps little with the analysis when 
the government is faced with an encrypted file which it believes holds 
relevant data but cannot decrypt without the defendants help, and 
only helps if the government is holding a list of specific, non-
privileged documents which it would like the defendant to turn over. 
Mr. Reitinger also asserts that a decryption key stored on the 
computer can be subpoenaed by the same standards as the plaintext of 
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the documents that it protects, since the key has an independent 
existence even if it resides on the computer in an encrypted form.282  
This is true for some types of cryptography, but handing over the key 
may grant far more than the ability to decrypt a specific file.  It may 
grant the ability to decrypt large amounts of data in that person's 
possession, as well as vast swaths of communications sent to or by 
that person if the key is used to secure e-mail.283  It may also grant the 
ability to sign or authenticate digital documents as though they were 
from that person.284 Also, the key itself is likely to be encrypted and 
may well be hidden or stored with other personal digital information, 
which returns to the question of whether the person with the key can 
be compelled to locate and decrypt it.285 
On the other hand, Mr. Reitinger suggests that keys that are never 
actually stored and only memorized may be immune to subpoena, but 
that the government is likely to be able to break the encryption that 
“use small, memorized keys”.286  This idea is problematic.  Where the 
government can show that the Fifth Amendment does not provide 
protection, such as by showing that an exception applies, then the fact 
that the key exists only in the memory should not be a bar to the 
government compelling the use of that key to decrypt the files that it 
wishes to access.  It may prove a bar to forcing the defendant to turn 
over the actual password or key, but that is rarely what the 
government is actually seeking. Moreover, if courts were to give 
additional protection to keys that were purely memorized, those 
wishing to conceal contraband would likely find ways to memorize 
long keys with sufficient complexity.  Many Muslims memorize the 
entire Quran, which is roughly 80,000 words long, to earn the title 
Hafiz and show their devotion to Islam.287  There is also a large 
number of people who memorize thousands of digits of Pi, which are 
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essentially random since Pi is a provably irrational number.288  Using 
quotes from the Quran or digits from Pi as a password would provide 
poor security, as many others would likely duplicate it, but it shows 
the capability of people to memorize long tracts when they are 
motivated to do so.  Further, if special protection was given to 
encryption schemes that did not use an independent key and instead 
favored encryption which encrypted directly with the password, then 
programmers would likely oblige by creating new interfaces which 
made use of exceedingly long passwords easier, and perhaps with use 
of tools to help people create and memorize passwords which were 
both strong and memorable without ever writing them down. 
Precedent does not require memorized keys to have special protection 
over those that are recorded on a computer, and policy suggests that it 
would yield poor results if they were given special treatment over 
other keys. 
VI. DENIABLE ENCRYPTION, STEGANOGRAPHY, AND COMPLICATIONS 
A. Stenography 
Although it should generally be relatively easy for the prosecutor 
to demand decryption when there is a need, deniable encryption and 
steganography could make it difficult for the prosecutor to meet even 
a low standard of proof when they are properly employed.  
Steganography is a collection of techniques for concealing data inside 
of other data.   
Steganography, at least in its modern form, involves altering a file 
to contain additional information while concealing the fact that the 
file has been altered.289  The word itself is from a Greek phrase for 
“concealing writing” and versions of steganography have been used 
since at least 440 B.C.290  Demeratus used steganography to pass 
concealed messages about a planned invasion of Sparta by Xerxes.291  
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At the time, writing tablets that were covered in wax were in common 
use, with messages being written onto the wax.292  The wax could later 
be melted to reuse the table.293  Demeratus removed the wax from his 
tablet and wrote his concealed messages directly upon the wood 
backing, and then covered them with wax before sending them back to 
Sparta.294   
In the more modern era, steganography has been used by al-
Qaeda agents to pass messages and conceal documents.295  It has 
allegedly been used by Russian spies to send messages among 
themselves over the Internet.296  Other groups have used it to attempt 
to get around restrictions on free speech by more totalitarian 
governments.297  In more commercial settings, steganographic 
techniques are used to embed unobtrusive watermarks into media 
files to help media companies track and combat piracy.298  There are 
several different forms of digital steganography, but they all involve 
modifying a file to embed additional information into it in a way that 
is difficult to detect.299   
One of the simplest forms of steganography is called least 
significant bit substitution and involves modifying the last bit out of 
every byte of a file, such as an image, to carry the intended message.300  
This can result in the file being noticeably degraded, which may 
arouse suspicion.301  More sophisticated methods exist that are less 
likely to be apparent on casual inspection and are also more resilient 
to damage or modification to the file.302 Generally, the larger and 
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more complex the file is, the more data may be hidden in it without 
making the hidden information obvious.303 Steganography can 
occasionally be located by statistical analysis, but this is difficult if the 
amount of data hidden is small.304  In some less sophisticated forms of 
steganography, or where the data being concealed is large compared 
to the file in which it is hidden, steganography can introduce 
noticeable distortions in the file.305 This is particularly true of audio 
files.306 The data may be encrypted as well as concealed, or it may 
merely be concealed by techniques from steganography.307 A video file 
had 141 text files contained within it in a terrorism case in Berlin.308  
Although media files such as videos, images, or sound files are often 
used, software exists to hide messages inside of e-mails that would 
appear to be spam on the surface.309 
The challenge for prosecutors and law enforcement is that 
steganography, by design, can be hard to detect.310  Even after seizing 
a hard drive or otherwise acquiring the files that contain information 
hidden in this way, the prosecution may not be aware of the hidden 
data.  Most likely, if they do discover data that is both concealed and 
encrypted then they will be able to demand decryption under the 
foregone conclusion doctrine.311 By that point they would have 
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discovered that the encrypted data existed, and would know precisely 
where it was, and the fact that it was specifically concealed by 
steganography would be an indication that the data was not random 
and did not represent a blank file after decryption.312 
However, the prosecution most likely will not be able to compel a 
defendant to tell them if they are using steganography.  Even if the 
prosecution had independent confirmation that steganography was 
used, they would not be able to demand that the defendant tell them 
what files had the hidden information or where on a hard drive the 
data was hidden.  If the prosecution needed to ask that question, it 
would be clear that it could not specify where the files in question 
were with any particularity.  Thus, while prosecution may be able to 
compel decryption of steganographically hidden data that is also 
protected by cryptography, it must locate the data without the aid of 
the defendant. 
B. Deniable Encryption 
Deniable encryption can create a similar issue.  Deniable 
encryption comes in several forms and generally exists to provide the 
ability to plausibly deny that encryption was used at all.  Alternatively, 
it can enable someone to reveal some files within an encrypted 
container and plausibly deny that there are other files still encrypted 
within that container.313  One of the more commonly used forms is a 
Deniable File System, which is implemented by products such as 
TrueCrypt.314 In a standard Deniable File System setup, the user 
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creates an encrypted file system whose existence and status as an 
encrypted file is not hidden.315 This encrypted file is protected by a 
password and the normal technological protections given to an 
encrypted file.316 It may be filled up with data which appears sensitive 
so that, should anyone acquire the password for this encrypted file, it 
will not appear to be unusually empty.317  Then, another encrypted 
volume, often called a hidden volume, is created within the outer 
encrypted volume using mathematical techniques to make it difficult 
to tell that there is additional data rather than merely space within the 
encrypted file that has not yet been populated with data.318 
This technique is meant to make it possible to reveal the password 
to the outer volume or decrypt the outer volume in front of third 
parties while those third parties remain unable to decrypt or even 
prove the existence of the inner hidden volume.319 Security experts 
have shown that there may be ways to determine that a hidden file 
system exists, but those methods are not reliable.320 Most of those 
methods exploit leakage from the operating system or applications 
that work with the data inside the hidden file system, rather than 
through anything which may be inherently discovered about the 
hidden file system itself or the container encrypted file.321  In order to 
address the possibilities of such leaks, later versions of TrueCypt 
implemented a Deniable Operating System Feature.322 
With a Deniable Operating System, TrueCrypt sets up a partition 
for a regular operating system which will be used only with less 
sensitive data and may serve as a decoy.323 This regular operating 
system is encrypted by TrueCrypt with a password, but is not meant to 
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be denied.324  The program also sets up another partition that contains 
an outer volume along with a hidden volume and a hidden operating 
system.325  The outer volume is protected by a different password and 
is not meant to be denied, while the hidden volume is protected, along 
with the hidden operating system, by a third password.326  The user 
should be able to reveal the password for the decoy operating system 
and the outer volume on the second partition while still concealing the 
existence, much less the password, for the hidden volume.327  Because 
the hidden volume is only accessed by the hidden operating system, it 
avoids many of the data leakage problems which are endemic to 
deniable file systems.328  It may create other unusual indictors, which 
could arouse suspicion that additional data is being concealed.329  For 
instance, it is unusual, even if there are some plausible reasons for it, 
to have two partitions protected by encryption on a single drive.330    
Whether it is hidden as a deniable file system or with a hidden 
operating system, the significant part of both forms of deniable 
encryption is that they possess a hidden volume whose existence can 
be concealed even while supplying one of the passwords.    
For an analogy, if the outer encrypted file is a safe, then the hidden 
volume is the locked, false bottom inside the safe.  This presents a 
somewhat different case than examining a simple encrypted file, 
which may be decrypted in its entirety with one password.  Even if the 
prosecutor can establish that they know the existence, location, and 
authenticity of the outer encrypted file and may even have substantial 
knowledge of the contents, they may not know of the existence of the 
inner hidden volume.  If a prosecutor knows through other evidence, 
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such as an overheard conversation or leakage of data from 
applications, that there is a hidden volume on the drive, they still may 
not be able to establish with reasonable particularity that they know 
where it is.  For instance, if there are multiple encrypted files capable 
of housing a hidden volume, the prosecutor is unlikely to know which 
of those encrypted files stores the hidden volume even if they have 
knowledge of the existence of a hidden volume.   
If a prosecutor knows of the existence of a hidden volume within a 
particular encrypted file system, then whether or not the prosecutor 
can demand decryption may depend on the standard used.  Under the 
standard proposed in this paper, that would be sufficient and the 
prosecutor would be able to demand decryption of the file.  Under the 
standard as articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, this would likely not 
be sufficient, but the prosecutor could remedy that if they could show 
some knowledge of the actual contents of that hidden volume.331 
However, if the prosecutor merely knows that a hidden volume is used 
with a machine but it may be in any of several encrypted files 
associated with that machine than this is unlikely to be sufficient to 
satisfy the foregone conclusion doctrine even under a broad standard. 
It may not be sufficient to meet the standard even if the prosecutor 
has some knowledge of what files they expect to find.  In that 
situation, they would not be able to show that it knew the location of 
the requested files with reasonable particularity. 
It is most likely that demanding that the defendant turn over the 
unencrypted contents would not compel them to reveal the existence 
or the contents of a hidden volume unless that was specified with 
sufficient particularity.  Although the hidden volume is, in a sense, 
within the encrypted volume, there is a sense in which it is separate 
and distinct from it.  The hidden volume is tracked and handled 
separately by the encryption software and is mounted332 separately by 
the operating system.  Even if the prosecution later discovers the 
existence of the hidden file system, it is likely that it would not be able 
to sustain a perjury charge or other remedy333 since the defendant 
could say that the hidden volume is a separate entity from the one the 
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prosecutor and court identified in the subpoena or warrant, and in a 
technological sense this would be true.334 Thus, even under 
compulsion to provide decryption, a defendant is likely entitled to 
conceal the existence of the hidden volume unless and until the 
prosecutor can establish that it exists. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In order to best protect the interests of the public in retaining their 
right to avoid incriminating themselves while providing the 
prosecution with the evidence it needs, the foregone conclusion 
doctrine should be read broadly when determining if the defendant 
can be compelled to decrypt files that are already in the prosecution's 
possessions.  As the test requires, the prosecution must establish that 
it knows with reasonable particularity the existence and location of 
the data that it seeks, and that it can authenticate the encrypted 
documents or devices independently.  But, this test should be met 
when the prosecution can show the location and existence of the 
encrypted files along with showing that the defendant is actually 
capable of decrypting the files, and that it will be able to authenticate 
the files.  In particular, the prosecution should not have to, and the 
line of cases from the Supreme Court does not require the prosecution 
to, demonstrate knowledge of the actual contents of the encrypted 
files.  After receiving the unencrypted version, the prosecution should 
be banned from using the defendant’s act of decrypting or producing 
the unencrypting version against them but allowed to use the 
recovered documents.  This best provides the prosecution with 
evidence to which it should be entitled, while respecting the Fifth 
Amendment rights of the defendant. 
This standard should also apply to data which is protected by 
steganography or deniable encryption.  However, their nature as 
hidden information may make it substantially harder for the 
prosecution to show that it has knowledge with reasonable 
particularity of either the location or the existence of files protected in 
this way.  As an extension of that fact, a subpoena compelling a person 
to produce an unencrypted version of an encrypted file should be 
satisfied by the production of the unencrypted form of the outer layer 
when deniable encryption has been used to create a hidden volume.  
To get an unencrypted copy of the contents of a hidden volume, the 
 
 
 
 
334 See TRUECRYPT, supra note 47, at 38–39. The hidden volume encompasses a separate 
space from the standard volume and even has a separate header.  The fact that this 
separate space is located where some of the free space for the standard volume would have 
been if the hidden volume did not exist does not change this fact. Id. 
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prosecution must specify that they  wants the contents from the 
hidden volume in the subpoena after establishing that it knows the 
existence and location of the hidden  

